

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 TEL AVIV 0664

EXDIS TREAT AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PGOV, EG, IS, MILI
SUBJECT: WEIZMAN'S IMPRESSIONS OF SADAT AND MILITARY COMMITTEE
MEETING

SUMMARY: I MET TODAY WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE WEIZMAN WHO BRIEFED ME ON HIS CAIRO VISIT. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER SADAT'S "INTRANSIGENCE" WHEN INSISTING ON ISRAELI RETURN TO THE PRE-67 BORDER. ISRAEL IS CURENTLY INSISTING ON RETENTION OF TWO AIRFIELDS AND SOME SETTLEMENTS. EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS INCLUDE A BUFFER ZONE, U.N. PRESENCE AND A NARROW DEMILITARIZED ZONE. SHARM EL SHEIKH, WITHOUT U.N. PRESENCE, IS APPARENTLY NOT A PROBLEM. THE QUESTION OF A TRADE OF TERRITORY DID NOT COME UP IN THE DISCUSSIONS, BUT SHOULD BE SERIOUSLY ADDRESSED AS POSSIBLE SOLUTION. WEIZMAN CONCERNED ABOUT INTERNAL CHALLENGES TO BEGIN AS A RESULT OF SADAT'S "STONEWALL". HE HIMSELF IS DETERMINED TO KEEP LOOKING FOR COMPROMISE BUT IS CONCERNED AS TO HOW TO PROCEED. WEIZMAN ADMITS SETTLEMENT ISSUE POORLY HANDLED BY GOI. FURTHER CAIRO DISCUSSIONS DEFERRED BY EGYPT AWAITING WHAT OCCURS IN JERUSALEM. EGYPT AND ISRAEL WILL HAVE MILITARY OBSERVERS AT JERUSALEM POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS.

1. I MET TODAY WITH MIN OF DEF WEIZMAN AT HIS HOME AT HIS
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INVITATION FROM 1145 UNTIL 1320. WEIZMAN WAS ALONE. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY COLONEL WILLIAMS. ALTHOUGH PARTLY UNDER THE WEATHER DUE TO A COLD AND SORE THROAT, WEIZMAN WAS STILL ON A HIGH BASED UPON HIS PERCEPTION OF HIS RECEPTION BY THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC BUT PERPLEXED AND SOMEWHAT FRUSTRATED BY THE APPARENT STALEMATE OF THE CAIRO DISCUSSIONS, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE

SETTLEMENTS QUESTION. BUT HE BELIEVES THEY MADE A GOOD BEGINNING, AND HE SAYS HE AND GAMASY GOT ON WELL.

2. WEIZMAN CAME AWAY FROM BOTH HIS MEETING WITH SADAT AT ASWAN AND HIS CAIRO DISCUSSIONS WITH GAMASY WITH THE FIRM BELIEF THAT BOTH SIDES ARE TRYING TO REACH AGREEMENT AND WILL CONTINUE TO TRY. HOWEVER, HE IS OBVIOUSLY VERY MUCH CONCERNED OVER WHAT HE BELIEVES TO BE SADAT'S STONEWALLING CONCERNING ISRAEL'S PROPOSALS THAT SOME OF THE SETTLEMENTS AND TWO OF THE AIRFIELDS BE RETAINED BY ISRAEL. HE DESCRIBED HIS MEETINGS WITH SADAT AS HAVING BEEN CONDUCTED IN AN EXTREMELY FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE WITH HE (WEIZMAN) DOING 70 PERCENT OF THE TALKING DURING THE HOUR LONG DISCUSSION. SADAT'S APPROACH WAS QUOTE WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE UNQUOTE; WEIZMAN'S WAS TO SAY THAT HE BELIEVES THAT SADAT'S INITIATIVE WAS COMPARABLE TO MAN'S FIRST LANDING ON THE MOON, BUT THAT NOW WAS THE TIME TO GET BACK DOWN TO EARTH. HE TOLD SADAT OF BEGIN'S DIFFICULTY IN DELIVERING MORE THAN WHAT HAS BEEN PROPOSED BY ISRAEL AND ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES BEGIN AND HE HAD ENCOUNTERED BEATING BACK ATTACKS ON THESE VERY SAME PROPOSALS DURING THE HERUT PARTY MEETING LAST SUNDAY. HE IS CONCERNED THAT SADAT DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE CHALLENGES THAT BEGIN AND THE PARTY FACE AND TOLD SADAT THAT IF HE
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CONTINUED TO STAND BY HIS POSITION HE MIGHT FIND THAT AT A CERTAIN STAGE THERE WOULD NOT BE AN ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO TALK TO. SADAT'S APPARENT RESPONSE WAS TO SAY THAT QUOTE MY PEOPLE UNQUOTE WOULD NEVER ACCEPT ANYTHING LESS THAN A COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY. WEIZMAN LEFT THE SADAT MEETING WITH THE DEFINITE IMPRESSION THAT SADAT BELIEVES HE MUST FIND A SOLUTION WHICH WILL RESULT IN THE ISRELI RETURN TO THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDRIES. WEIZMAN ATTEMPTED TO PERSUADE SADAT THAT THE TERM "MINOR MODIFICATION" MUST BE APPLIED TO THE SINAI AND THAT NO ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO WIPE OUT THE SETTLEMENTS AND PLOW UP TWO AIRFIELDS. HE SAYS THAT HE ASKED SADAT TO THINK IT OVER AND THAT HE (WEIZMAN) WOULD BE STANDING BY TO RETURN TO CAIRO WHENEVER SADAT CALLED HIM.

3. WEIZMAN AND GAMASY THEN RETURNED TO CAIRO AND THE DISCUSSIONS GOT UNDERWAY. WEIZMAN SAYS THAT THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS WERE AS FOLLOWS:
A. WTHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE SINAI TO BEHIND THE PRE-67 INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY.

B. ESTABLISHMENT OF A 15 KILOMETER BUFFER ZONE,
OCCUPIED BY UNITED NATIONS FORCES, ALONG THE INTER-
NATIONAL BORDER FROM KHAN YUNUS TO EILAT.

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C. A DEMILITARIZED ZONE OF APPROXIMATELY 40
KILOMETERS FROM THE BUFFER IN THE SINAI AND ONE OF
OF TWO-THREE KILOMETERS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE. EGYPTIAN
FORCES COULD MOVE EAST OF THE CURRENT BUFFER AND COULD
OCCUPY THE AIRFIELDS IN THE SINAI. THERE WOULD BE NO
RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON THE PRESENCE OF
EGYPTIAN TROOPS IN THE SINAI WEST OF THE DEMILITARIZED
ZONE. WEIZMAN RESPONDED BY REPEATING TO GAMASY THAT
THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO
MAINTAIN SETTLEMENTS IN THE RAFAH AREA AND THE TWO
AIRFIELDS IN THE SINAI, ONE EAST OF EL ARISH AND ONE
WEST OF EILAT. SHARM EL SHEIKH WAS APPARENTLY NOT
A PROBLEM FOR EITHER SIDE.
THE EGYPTIANS DID NOT WANT ANY UN IN SHARM. BUT
WOULD ACCEPT UN THERE IF NECESSARY FOR AGREEMENT.

4. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS WEIZMAN TOLD GAMASY
THAT HE FELT THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING
ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER CONCERNING THE DEMILITARIZATION
OF THE SINAI. IT COULD HAVE BEEN THAT BEGIN IS WRONG,
ALTHOUGH WEIZMAN DOESN'T THINK SO, BUT BEGIN'S
UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT SADAT HAD SAID IN JERUSALEM WAS THAT THERE
WOULD BE NO EGYPTIAN FORCES EAST OF THE MITLA AND
GIDDI PASSES. GAMASY OBVIOUSLY DISAGREES WITH THAT
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INTERPRETATION. AS THE TALKS IN CAIRO REACHED AN IMPASSE, WEIZMAN AND GAMASY MUTUALLY AGREED THAT EACH SIDE HAD MADE THEIR PROPOSALS AND EACH SIDE HAD REJECTED THE OTHER'S. THUS IT WAS TIME NOW TO RETURN TO THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS FOR CONSULTATION. AS HE WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE CAIRO WEIZMAN WAS TAKEN ASIDE BY GAMASY AND WAS INFORMED THAT QUOTE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS UNQUOTE GAMASY WAS TELLING WEIZMAN THAT IT COULD NOT YET BE DECIDED WHEN THE DISCUSSIONS MIGHT RECONVENE. WEIZMAN BELIEVES THAT THIS IS A DIRCT RESULT OF SADAT'S DESIRE TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS IN JERUSALEM BEFORE CONTINUING ON IN CAIRO. THIS DISTURBED WEIZMAN WHO HAD HOPED TO KEEP SOME MOMENTUM GOING. HE WAS MORE DISTURBED BY GAMASY'S REMARKCUY THE EFFECT THAT QUOTE WHATEVER HAPPENS WE WILL REMAIN FRIENDS UNQUOTE. WEIZMAN VIEWED THIS AS AN AMBER, PERHAPS RED, LIGHT WEIZMAN VIEWED THIS AS AN AMBER, PERHAPS RED, LIGHT AND SAID THAT BEING FRIENDS IS A VERY FINE THING BUT THAT NOTHING CONSTRUCTIVE COULD COME OUT WITHOUT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

5. I ASKED WEIZMAN IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBLE TRADE OF TERRITORY IN THE SINAI FOR SOME OF PRE-67 ISRAEL. WEIZMAN SAID THAT THE QUESTION DID NOT COME UP IN CAIRO. HE HAD BROUGHT IT UP AT THE EARLIER MEETING IN ISMAILIA AND IT HAD BEEN REJECTED BY GAMASY AT THAT TIME. HE HAD HOPED SADAT WOULD RAISE IT, BUT HE DID NOT. WEIZMAN FEELS THAT IF IT'S TO COME UP AGAIN IT MUST BE BROUGHT UP BY THE EGYPTIANS (OR THE U.S.) I SAID THAT SO FAR AS I KNEW THIS SUBJECT HAD NEVER COME UP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EGYPT. WEIZMAN, WHO OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERS TERRITORIAL EXCHANGE TO BE THE DESIRABLE OUTCOME, RECOMMENDED THAT THIS BE BROUGHT UP WITH BEGIN
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BY EITHER THE U.S. OR BETTER STILL BY THE EGYPTIANS. HE SUGGESTED THAT SECRETARY VANCE TALK TO BEGIN ABOUT THIS IN JERUSALEM.

6. THROUGHOUT THE MEETING I KEPT PROBING FOR WEIZMAN'S BOTTOM LINE ON SETTLEMENTS BOTH FROM A PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW AND FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF HIS GOVERNMENT. THE QUESTION OF WHAT HAPPENS TO SHARM EL SHEIKH WAS ACTUALLY QUITE SIMPLE. WEIZMAN BELIEVES THAT THEY CAN GIVE UP SHARM AND WITHDRAW BACK TO THE VICINITY OF EILAT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY AS LONG AS THE AIRFIELD AT ETZION IS RETAINED BY ISRAEL.

WEIZMAN SAYS THAT HE CAN HANDLE ANY PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT ARISE ACROSS THE BORDER IN JORDAN OR ELSEWHERE FROM THAT AIRFIELD AND THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OR U.S. GUARANTEES ABOUT INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS WOULD SUFFICE AS FAR AS KEEPING OPEN THE GULF OF AQABA. ON THE QUESTION OF THE SETTLEMENTS AND THE TWO AIRFIELDS HE WAS MUCH MORE ADAMANT, AT LEAST INITIALLY. HE KEPT RETURNING TO HIS BELIEF THAT SADAT MUST FACE UP TO THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO NEGOTIATE, MUST RESPOND TO THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AND THAT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE IS TO MAINTAIN THE SETTLEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE DOESN'T SEE HOW SADAT CAN BE SO CONCERNED ABOUT ONLY THREE TO FOUR PERCENT OF THE ENTIRE SINAI REMAINING IN ISRAELI HANDS. I POINTED THAT SOME OF THESE SETTLEMENTS

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WERE WITHIN 10 KILOMETERS OF EL ARISH AND ASKED IF THE PROBLEM WAS WHICH SETTLEMENTS ARE INDISPENSABLE. WEIZMAN SAID "THIS COULD BE TALKED ABOUT," BUT THAT NO ISRAELI GOVERNMENT COULD TELL ALL THE SETTLERS TO GO HOME AND SURVIVE. AT THIS POINT WE LOOKED AT A MAP AND WEIZMAN INDICATED THE LINE WHICH HE FELT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL. (HE DID NOT INDICATE THAT THIS WAS THE LINE THAT HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO EGYPT). POINTING AT THE MAP, HE DESCRIBED AN AREA WHICH BEGINS ON THE SEA AT A POINT APPROXIMATELY HALF WAY BETWEEN EL ARISH AND RAFAH AND CURVES IN AN ARC DOWN TO THE PRE-67 BOUNDARY JUST WEST OF NIZZANA. THE LINE THEN GENERALLY FOLLOWS THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

UNTIL IT APPROACHES THE GULF OF AQABA AT WHICH TIME
IT SWINGS TO THE WEST SO AS TO ENCOMPASS ETZION
AIRFIELD AND THEN DROPS DOWN TO THE GULF. WE NOTED
THAT THIS LINE WOULD GIVE UP SOME SETTLEMENTS NEAR
EL ARISH AND WEIZMAN AGREED. HE CONSIDERS THIS TO
BE THE MOST DOVISH POSITION POSSIBLE FOR ANY ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT AND IF NOT ACCEPTED BY SADAT, BEGIN WILL
BE FORCED TO GO TO THE PEOPLE WITH SADAT'S PROPOSAL
TO RETURN TO THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY. THE PEOPLE
WILL REJECT IT. "SADAT MUST REALIZE THAT THE ISRAELI
PEOPLE HAVE A CLAUSTOPHOBIC SENSE OF LIFE;

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THAT THEY HAVE FOUGHT FIVE WARS IN THE SINAI AND DON'T
WANT TO FIGHT ANOTHER ONE." HE ALSO SAID THAT IF SADAT
WOULD ACCEPT THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL THAT ISRAEL WOULD
NOT BE TOO CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT IS AND WHAT IS NOT
DEMILITARIZED IN THE SINAI. THE TWO AIRFIELDS WOULD
PROVIDED THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY HE PERCEIVES AS
BEING REQUIRED. HE DID NOT PERCEIVE ISRAEL'S PROPOSALS
AS BEING THE QUOTE EXPANSIONISM UNQUOTE REFERRED TO
BY SADAT BUT RATHER AS "MINOR MODIFICATIONS" WHICH
PROVIDE THE GOVERNMENT WITH A SOLUTION TO SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS AND THE SETTLEMENTS. HE REITERATED
THAT IF THIS PROPOSAL IS REJECTED, ONE OUTCOME COULD
BE THE ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF A SINAI BELT 50 KILOMETERS
WIDE FROM WEST OF EL ARISH TO RAS MUHAMMED. HE
WOULD,'T CHEER ABOUT IT; AS A MATTER OF FACT HE SAID
HE WOULD BE UNHAPPY ABOUT IT, BUT THAT IT
APPEARS TO HIM THAT THIS COULD BE A RESULT. I ASKED
HIM THAT IF AGREEMENT WERE REACHED TO RETAIN THE AIRFIELDS
AND SOME SETTLEMENTS COULD HE LIVE WITHOUT A BUFFER ZONE AND WITH-
OUT THE U.N. HE RESPONDED THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD PREFER A BORDER
WITH EGYPT WITHOUT A BUFFER AND WITH AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHICH
FORCES WERE ALLOWED IN THE REGION, WITH JOINT
TEAMS INSPECTING THE OBSERVANCE OF THOSE ACCORDS. HE
EMPHASIZED THAT BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL WOULD WANT U.S.,
NOT U.N., ELEMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN SUCH TEAMS, HOWEVER.
HE FELT THAT THIS TYPE OF ARRANGEMENT COULD BE
EASILY MAE. HE ALSO SAID THAT IF SADAT WOULD ONLY
COME FORWARD AND AGREE WITH THE RETENTION OF TWO
AIRFIELDS AND QUOTE THE GOD-DAMN UNQUOTE SETTLEMENTS
HE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT GO A
LONG WAY IN RELAXING THE DEMANDS CONCERNING THE
WIDTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE.

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7. I TOLD WEIZMAN THAT THE CURRENT ISRAELI POSITION ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE SINAI APPEARED TO BE IN DIVERGENCE WITH WHAT HAS BEEN PUBLICALLY SAID A NUMBER OF TIMES AND PREIVATELY SAID TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THIS WAS WHAT NO SETTLEMENTS WILL DETERMINE THE FINAL BORDERS OF ISRAEL, AND THAT SETTLEMENTS WHICH REMAINED OUTSIDE THE BORDERS AFTER A PEACE TREATY WOULD EITHER BE REMOVED OR WOULD BE LEFT UNDER MUTUAL AGREEMENT. WEIZMAN INDICATED THAT HE DISAGREED WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. I SAID I THOUGHT THAT THE ENTIRE SETTLEMENTS QUESTION HAD BEAYRKUZRZ HANDLED IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA IN RECENT WEEKS, AND THAT THE HANDLING HAD BEEN EXTREMELY HARMFUL TO THE ISRAELI CAUSE. IN THIS WEIZMAN AGREED TOTALLY AND HE RECOMMENDED THAT I SAY THE SAME THING (PERHAPS IN MORE DIPLOMATIC TERMS) TO BEGIN WHI I SEE HIM. HE ALSO ADDED THAT HE HAD VOTED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ACTION IN THE CABINET. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE SETTLEMENTS ACTION HAD ALSO COMPLICATED SADAT'S LIFE, BUT INSISTED THAT IF SADAT REALIZED AND ACCPETED THAT HE COULD GET PEACE FOR ONLY THREE OR FOUR PERCENT OF THE SINAI, HE WOULD GAIN PRESTIGE AND HIS ARAB HONOR WOULD NOT BE HURT. HE ADMITTED THAT THE SETTLE-

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MENTS HAD BECOME A PRESTIGE AND HONOR PROBLEM FOR ISRAEL, JUST AS THE SINAI IS FOR SADAT. THE EGYPTIANS HAD CHALLENGED HIM CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR HAVING THE SETTLEMENTS FROM THE DEFENSIVE POINT OF VIEW. WEIZMAN ADMITS THAT THE CHANGE IN WEAPON SYSTEMS HAS RESULTED IN A DECREASE OF THE HISTORICAL

CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEFENSE BY THE SETTLEMENTS. HOWEVER, FROM A POINT OF VIEW OF NORMALIZATION, SETTLEMENTS ALONG THE BORDER CONTRIBUTE TO RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COUNTRIES AND CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE. HE USED AS AN EXAMPLE THE RESIDENTS OF OVER A MILLION EGYPTIANS ALONG THE SUEZ CANAL WHICH HE IS SURE CONTRIBUTES IF NOT TO PEACE CERTAINLY TO MORE RATIONAL DECISIONS ABOUT WAR.

8. AT THIS POINT I THINK THAT WEIZMAN EXPRESSED HIS BOTTOM LINE. AFTER ALL THIS DISCUSSION ABOUT THE ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT FOR THE RETENTION OF SETTLEMENTS AND OF THE TWO AIRFIELDS, HE ASKED WOULD I, AS A FRIEND, RECOMMEND ISRAELI CONSIDERATION OF RETURNING TO THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDRIES. I RESPONDED QUOTE YES, AS A FRIEND, IN EXCHANGE FOR REAL PEACE. UNQUOTE. WEIZMAN, IN A VERY SERIOUS MANNER, THEN SAID THAT HE HAD HIS EGO TOO AND THAT HE WOULD LOVE TO DO EVERYTHING QUOTE OR CLOSE SECRET

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TO EVERYTHING UNQUOTE TO ACHIEVE PEACE. ALONG THIS LINE THE TIME ELEMENT CONCERNING WITHDRAWALS COULD BE VERY IMPORTANT QUOTE AND BY TIME ELEMENT I DON'T MEAN 18 MONTHS. WE MUST COME UP WITH SOMETHING WE CAN SELL TO THE PEOPLE AND SADAT SHOULD NOT BE NAIVE ABOUT THAT UNQUOTE. HE BELIEVES THAT THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT MUST PROVE TO THE PEOPLE THAT SADAT IS BEING RESPONSIVE TO ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF THE NEEDS FOR SECURITY.

9. IN CLOSING WEIZMAN SAID THAT HE HAD LEFT GEN TAMIR IN CAIRO AS HIS REPRESENTATIVE AND HAD TALKED TO HIM THIS MORNING BY PHONE. TAMIR HAD RECOMMENDED TO THE EGYPTIANS THAT THE CAIRO DISCUSSIONS GET ROLLING AGAIN WITHOUT WAITING FOR REACTIONS TO JERUSALEM BUT HAD RECEIVED NO REACTION FROM THE EGYPTIANS AS YET. TAMIR HAD ALSO TOLD HIM THAT EGYPTIAN BRIGADIER GENERAL AWAYDI (PHONETIC SPELLING) WOULD BE COMING TO JERUSALEM TO BE THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE AT THE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS. GENERAL AWAYDI IS AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. WEIZMAN INTENDS TO ASSIGN BRIGADIER GENERAL SAGI, INTELLIGENCE CHIEF OF ESTIMATES, TO THE JERUSALEM TALKS AS HIS REPRESENTATIVE.

COMMENT: I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO BELIEVE THAT ANY GREAT STRIDES FORWARD WERE TAKEN IN CAIRO, BUT ALSO CONSIDER IT WOULD BE VERY WRONG TO ACCEPT VIEW THAT THERE WAS NOT SOME POSITIVE MOVEMENT. SHARM AND THE SETTLEMENTS BETWEEN SHARM

AND EILAT HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN DROPPED FROM THE GOI
WANT LIST AND WITH THEM GO SIGNIFICANT AIR AND NAVAL
INSTALLATIONS. IN WEIZMAN WE HAVE A SINCERE AND
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DEDICATED INDIVIDUAL FACED WITH SEVERE
INTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURES. IT APPEARS TO ME
THAT WEIZMAN, THE ISRAELI, MAY BE PREPARED TO RETURN
TO THE PRE-67 BOUNDARIES. HOWEVER WEIZMAN, THE
POLITICAL LEADER, IS WELL AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS BEGIN
AND HE FACE WITHIN THEIR OWN POLITICAL PARTY
IF SUCH PROPOSALS ARE MADE AND IS NOW CONCERNED OVER
HOW TO PROCEED. WE WERE OBVIOUSLY CORRECT WHEN WE
APPLIED THE LABEL TO SETTLEMENTS AS BEING QUOTE
OBSTACLES TO PEACE UNQUOTE.
I BELIEVE IT WILL SOON BE TIME TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT
A TRADE OF SOME ISRAELI SAND EAST OF THE 1967 BOUNDARY
FOR SOME OF THE NOW FERTILE BUT FORMALLY SAND AREA
TO THE WEST OF RAFAH. WEIZMAN WILL SUPPORT SUCH A TRADE.
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